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IDENTITY THEFT ON SOCIAL NETWORKING SITES: 
DEVELOPING ISSUES OF INTERNET IMPERSONATION 
Maksim Reznik
*
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In New Jersey, a woman was prosecuted for identity theft 
after creating a fake Facebook profile that depicted her ex-boyfriend, 
a narcotics detective, as a sexual deviant and a drug addict.1  
Similarly, in California, a teenager who stole his classmate‟s 
Facebook password to post sexually explicit material about the victim 
was sentenced to a period not to exceed one year in a juvenile 
detention center.2  This Comment focuses on the dangers of social 
media sites when a person gains access to another‟s online account 
through two different methods: (1) stealing the third party‟s 
password,3 or (2) creating a completely fake profile and subsequently 
impersonating that person.4 
Social networking sites have become an integral part of how 
our society interacts on a daily basis.5  Facebook, the current leader in 
 
                                                                                                                                       
* J.D. Candidate 2013, Touro College Jacob D. Fuchsberg School of Law; B.A. 2010, 
University of Massachusetts, Amherst.  I would like to thank my friends and family for 
supporting me during the journey of law school and life.  I would also like to thank the 
Touro Law Review and the Touro Law faculty for making the publication of this article a 
possibility. 
1 Mark Hansen, NJ Woman Can Be Prosecuted over Fake Facebook Profile, Judge Rules, 
A.B.A. J. (Nov. 4, 2011), http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/woman_can_be_prosecuted_ 
over_fake_facebook_profile_judge_rules; see  FACEBOOK, http://www.facebook.com (last 
visited Nov. 19, 2012). 
2 In re Rolando S., 129 Cal. Rptr. 3d 49, 52 (Ct. App. 2011). 
3 See id. (discussing a case where a teenager received the password to a fellow classmate‟s 
email account by means of an unsolicited text message and used this information to access 
the classmate‟s Facebook account). 
4 See Draker v. Schreiber, 271 S.W.3d 318, 320-21 (Tex. App. 2008) (illustrating a case in 
which two students created a fake website profile of their principal on MySpace.com). 
5 Danah M. Boyd & Nicole B. Ellison, Social Network Sites: Definition, History, and 
Scholarship, available at http://jcmc.indiana.edu/vol13/issue1/boyd.ellison.html.  Social 
networking sites are “web-based services that allow individuals to . . . construct a public or 
1
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social networking sites, has approximately eight hundred and forty-
five million active users,6 and that number is expected to exceed one 
billion by the end of 2012.7  Recent studies show that eighty-five 
percent of college students spend a weekly average of 6.2 hours on 
Facebook.8  Twitter,9 which emerged in 2006 as a way to send status 
updates via text messages, currently has 200 million registered 
accounts, and experts expect that number to reach 900 million by the 
end of 2012.10  It can safely be assumed that social media sites will 
continue to grow and provide services for millions of individuals and 
companies. 
Such excessive growth of social media sites has led to an 
increasing number of Internet impersonation cases in the United 
States.11  This Comment focuses mainly on criminal liability for 
perpetrators of Internet impersonation, as opposed to the civil 
context, in which victims can sue perpetrators in tort.12  The purpose 
of this Comment is to identify how states are actively attempting to 
prevent online impersonation and to propose a federal statute to 
combat online impersonation.  This statute is based upon California 
and New York statutes,13 but also explicitly applies to the two 
                                                                                                                                       
semi-public profile within a bounded system.”  Id.  Users then “articulate a list of other users 
with whom they share a connection, and . . . view and traverse their lists of 
connections . . . made by others within the system.”  Id. 
6 Anson Alexander, Facebook User Statistics 2012 [Infographic], ANSON ALEX (Feb. 20, 
2012), http://ansonalex.com/infographics/facebook-user-statistics-2012-infographic/. 
7 Priit Kallas, Social Media Trends 2012: More Than 1 Billion People Using Facebook, 
DREAM GROW (Oct. 20, 2011), http://www.dreamgrow.com/social-media-trends-2012-more-
than-1-billion-people-using-facebook/. 
8 Jamison Barr & Emmy Lugus, Digital Threats on Campus: Examining the Duty of 
Colleges to Protect Their Social Networking Students, 33 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 757, 761 
(2011). 
9 TWITTER, http://www.twitter.com (last visited Nov. 19, 2012). 
10 Shea Bennett, Twitter on Track for 500 Million Total Users by March, 250 Million 
Active Users by End of 2012, MEDIA BISTRO (Jan. 13, 2012), 
http://www.mediabistro.com/alltwitter/twitter-active-total-users_b17655. 
11 Bradley Kay, Article, Extending Tort Liability to Creators of Fake Profiles on Social 
Networking Websites, 10 CHI.-KENT J. INTELL. PROP. 1, 3 (2010). 
12 Id. at 17 (“The causes of action for misappropriation of name or likeness and violation 
of right of publicity have been extended to acts committed over the Internet.”). 
13 See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 190.25(4) (McKinney 2008) (“A person is guilty of criminal 
impersonation . . . when he . . . [i]mpersonates another by communication by [I]nternet 
website or electronic means with intent to obtain a benefit or injure or defraud another, or by 
such communication pretends to be a public servant in order to induce another to submit to 
such authority or act in reliance on such pretense.”); CAL. PENAL CODE § 528.5 (West 2011) 
(setting forth that “any person who knowingly and without consent credibly impersonates 
2
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methods of Internet impersonation within the statutory language.14  
Section II discusses the emerging nationwide problem of Internet 
impersonation and provides examples of the two methods of online 
impersonation.  Section III explains how certain states are attempting 
to solve the problem of Internet impersonation.  Finally, section IV 
proposes solutions to limit the negative effects of online 
impersonation, including an ideal statute that the federal government 
and states should adopt when dealing with this issue. 
II. METHODS TO PERPETRATE IDENTITY THEFT ON SOCIAL 
MEDIA SITES 
Identity theft on the Internet can arise in two similar yet 
distinct ways.  The more common scenario of identity theft on the 
Internet arises when the perpetrator creates a fictitious profile of the 
victim and subsequently uses that identity for online 
communications.15  The second method occurs when the perpetrator 
steals a victim‟s password or indirectly gains access to a victim‟s 
social media account and then impersonates the victim by using that 
account.16 
A. Creating a Fake Social Media Site Profile 
Only a small number of states contain a statute explicitly 
referring to Internet impersonation.17  In these states, the possible 
                                                                                                                                       
another actual person through or on an Internet Web site or by other electronic means for 
purposes of harming, intimidating, threatening, or defrauding another person is guilty of a 
public offense”). 
14 See Kay, supra note 11 (discussing cases in which an individual creates a fake profile); 
see also In re Rolando S., 129 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 52 (involving a case where a teenager stole his 
classmate‟s password). 
15 Kay, supra note 11. 
16 See, e.g., In re Rolando S., 129 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 52 (“Appellant used the victim‟s email 
password and account to gain access to her Facebook account, where he posted, in her name, 
prurient messages on two of her male friends‟ pages (walls) and altered her profile 
description in a vulgar manner.”). 
17 See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 190.25(4) (establishing when an individual is liable for criminal 
impersonation); CAL. PENAL CODE § 528.5 (discussing the behavior that amounts to Internet 
impersonation); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 33.07 (West 2011) (“A person commits an 
offense if the person, without obtaining the other person‟s consent and with the intent to 
harm, defraud, intimidate, or threaten any person, uses the name or persona of another 
person to: (1) create a web page on a commercial social networking site or other Internet 
website; or (2) post or send one or more messages on or through a commercial social 
3
Reznik: Identity Theft on Social Networking
Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2013
458 TOURO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 29 
 
outcome of a case in which a perpetrator creates a fake profile to the 
detriment of the victim will be clear simply by reading the language 
of the state‟s statute.  Conversely, the potential results of such cases 
in states in which statutes are silent on issues of Internet 
impersonation will not be as clear, and furthermore, may lead to 
jurisdictional splits concerning this emerging issue.18 
A premier example of creating a fake social media site profile 
to defraud or otherwise harm the victim comes from a case in New 
Jersey.19  The case involves Dana Thornton, a woman who created a 
fake Facebook profile for her ex-boyfriend, a narcotics detective.20  
In the detective‟s fake Facebook profile, Thornton posted that the 
detective used drugs, hired prostitutes, and had herpes, including 
statements such as, “I‟m an undercover narcotics detective that gets 
high every day.”21  Thornton‟s attorney argued that the case should 
be dismissed because there was no New Jersey identity theft statute 
including Internet impersonation.22  The judge, however, refused to 
dismiss the case because “the law is „clear and unambiguous‟ . . . and 
does not specify the „means‟ by which the injury could occur.”23 
Although the judge decided not to dismiss the case, it “could 
be difficult to prosecute [Thornton] because of the way the New 
Jersey law is written.”24  Under the New Jersey statute, a person is 
guilty of identity theft if the person “impersonates another or assumes 
a false identity and does an act in such assumed character or false 
identity for the purpose of obtaining a benefit for himself or another 
or to injure or defraud another.”25  The memorandum in support of 
the bill for the New Jersey identity theft statute states that “personal 
identifying information includes name, address, telephone number, 
                                                                                                                                       
networking site or other Internet website, other than on or through an electronic mail 
program or message board program.”). 
18 Hansen, supra note 1 (paraphrasing Bradley Shear, a “lawyer who specializes in online 
issues,” who said that New York and California are leading the way for Internet 
impersonation cases and that he “expects to see more cases like this one in the near future” 
in other states). 
19 Id. 
20 Id. 
21 Ben Horowitz, Judge Rules Case of Belleville Woman‟s Fake Facebook Page Can 
Proceed, NJ.COM (Nov. 2, 2011), http://www.nj.com/news/index.ssf/2011/11/judge_rules_ 
case_of_fake_faceb.html. 
22 Hansen, supra note 1. 
23 Horowitz, supra note 21. 
24 Hansen, supra note 1. 
25 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C: 21-17 (West 2005). 
4
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social security number, place of employment, employee identification 
number, demand deposit account number, savings account number, 
credit card number and mother‟s maiden name.”26 
Evidently, the law is not as “clear and unambiguous” as the 
judge presiding over Dana Thornton‟s case presumed it to be.27  In 
fact, a thorough examination of the legislative intent behind the New 
Jersey statute of identity suggests that the New Jersey Legislature 
never intended its identity theft statute to encompass Internet 
impersonation.28  The summary of the bill provides that the conduct 
must satisfy three elements to rise to the level of a criminal offense: 
(1) “obtaining and using personal identifying information” as 
described in the bill; (2) absence of consent to obtain and use the 
identifying information; and (3) an “intent[ion] to obtain a benefit.”29  
Thornton clearly satisfied the first two elements when she used her 
ex-boyfriend‟s name for the Facebook profile without his consent.30  
However, there is potential for confusion and ambiguity with respect 
to the third element.31  The term “benefit” as defined by the statute 
“means, but is not limited to, any property, any pecuniary amount, 
any services, any pecuniary amount sought to be avoided or any 
injury or harm perpetrated on another where there is no pecuniary 
value.”32  Because of the absence of a pecuniary interest, the only 
substantive argument that the “benefit” element was satisfied was 
that Thornton caused a non-pecuniary “injury or harm” to her ex-
boyfriend; however, neither the bill nor the statute gives a definition 
or any assistance in interpreting what constitutes a non-pecuniary 
“injury or harm.”33 
In a preliminary hearing, the judge refused to dismiss the case 
because he believed that Thornton‟s impersonation “allegedly 
 
                                                                                                                                       
26 Governor‟s Conditional Veto Message, Bill nos. 2414, 1638 and 2456, 2005 Main 
Volume (N.J. 2005), available at N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C: 21-17. 
27 Horowitz, supra note 21. 
28 See Governor‟s Conditional Veto Message, Bill no. 2414 (stating that personal 
information be obtained and used without authorization and with intent to obtain a benefit in 
order to constitute a criminal offense). 
29 Id. 
30 Horowitz, supra note 21. 
31 See Governor‟s Conditional Veto Message, Bill no. 2414 (requiring “the intent to obtain 
a benefit”). 
32 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C: 21-17 (West 2005). 
33 Id.; Governor‟s Conditional Veto Message, Bill no. 2414. 
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„injured‟ the detective‟s reputation,” stating that the law “does not 
specify the „means‟ by which the injury could occur.”34  The judge 
did not, however, mention that the law failed to specify what type of 
non-pecuniary “injury or harm” was necessary or what extent the 
non-pecuniary “injury or harm” must be.35  Only with the broadest 
interpretation of the statute can a reasonable person conclude that 
Thornton‟s statement on her ex-boyfriend‟s fake Facebook profile is 
sufficient to satisfy the non-pecuniary harm or injury requirement 
under the benefit element. 
Nevertheless, the judge “refused to dismiss” Thornton‟s case 
and charged her with identity theft.36  The court that will adjudicate 
this case will potentially run into similar difficulties in analyzing the 
New Jersey identity theft statute, as the California court did in 
analyzing the California identity theft statute in In re Rolando S.37  In 
In re Rolando S., a juvenile defendant “gain[ed] access to [the 
victim‟s] Facebook account,” and “posted, in her name, prurient 
messages on two of her male friends‟ pages (walls) and altered her 
profile description in a vulgar manner.”38  The California Court of 
Appeals and the parties to the litigation applied California‟s 
traditional identity theft statute.39  Under that statute, the perpetrator 
is guilty if he “willfully obtains personal identifying information . . . 
of another person, and uses that information for any unlawful 
purpose . . . without the consent of that person.”40  Rolando argued 
that his conduct did not satisfy an unlawful purpose as required under 
the statute.41  The court analyzed the statute‟s legislative history to 
determine what type of conduct falls under “any unlawful purpose” in 
light of Rolando‟s argument that the term “unlawful purpose” was 
 
                                                                                                                                       
34 Horowitz, supra note 21. 
35 See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C: 21-17 (defining “benefit,” but failing to provide a definition 
for “injury or harm”). 
36 Horowitz, supra note 21. 
37 129 Cal. Rptr. 3d 49 (Ct. App. 2011).  The court went through a lengthy discussion in 
order to successfully apply an Internet impersonation scenario to the outdated identity theft 
statute, which was silent on Internet impersonation.  Id. at 55-56. 
38 Id. at 52.  One such comment made by the defendant under the victim‟s name on a male 
classmate‟s wall was as follows: “When we were dating we should have had sex.  I always 
thought you had a cute dick, maybe we can have sex sometime.”  Id. at 52 n.2 (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
39 Id. at 51-52. 
40 CAL. PENAL CODE § 530.5 (West 2011). 
41 In re Roland S., 129 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 53, 55. 
6
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ambiguous.42 
Through a lengthy and nebulous opinion, the California Court 
of Appeals ultimately determined that the legislature intended 
“unlawful purpose” to include acts prohibited by common law, such 
as intentional civil torts.43  The court held that Rolando‟s messages 
on the victim‟s Facebook profile constituted libel, which is an 
intentional civil tort, and therefore satisfied the statutory language of 
California‟s identity theft statute.44  The potential issues a New Jersey 
court may face in determining what type of “harm or injury” is 
sufficient for the New Jersey identity theft statute is analogous to the 
dispute in In re Rolando S. concerning what satisfied an “unlawful 
purpose” under the California identity theft statue.  In light of In re 
Rolando S., California immediately enacted a statute that specifically 
made identity theft on the Internet illegal in order to prevent future 
ambiguity.45 
The New Jersey legislature also has acted to amend New 
Jersey‟s identity theft statute to completely bar Internet 
impersonation.  The bill, which has passed the Assembly, is currently 
before the Senate.46  The amended statute will undoubtedly clarify the 
ambiguities that exist in New Jersey‟s identity theft statute 
concerning Internet impersonation, but what effect will its enactment 
have on Dana Thornton‟s case?  Thornton‟s attorney argued that the 
amendment of the law is exactly why “there was nothing illegal in 
Thornton‟s alleged postings.”47  Alternatively, the prosecutor, Robert 
Schwartz, argued that the amendment “is merely „a clarification‟ of 
current law,” and that “[i]n no way are [the legislators] saying 
electronic communication has been excluded” under the current 
statute, and in “[n]o way did the Legislature ever intend for Ms. 
Thornton to get away with this kind of conduct.”48 
For the reasons discussed above, there is a possibility that the 
court will hold that the language in the outdated identity theft statute 
is too broad to include Thornton‟s actions as illegal.  In that scenario, 
 
                                                                                                                                       
42 Id. at 55-56. 
43 Id. at 56-57. 
44 Id. at 57-58. 
45 See CAL. PENAL CODE § 528.5 (West 2011) (criminalizing Internet impersonation). 
46 Horowitz, supra note 21; see also Assemb. 2105, 215th Leg. (N.J. 2012). 
47 Horowitz, supra note 21. 
48 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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there must be a determination on whether the amended statute could 
retroactively apply to Dana Thornton.49  Under both the New Jersey 
and Federal Constitutions, however, a legislative body is prohibited 
form enacting “ex post facto” laws.50  An “ex post facto” law is 
defined as “any statute which makes a prior act, that was innocent 
when committed, a crime, which makes punishment for a crime more 
burdensome after its commission, or which deprives a defendant of a 
defense available when the act was committed.”51  Thus, if the court 
holds that the outdated New Jersey identity theft statute did not apply 
to Thornton‟s actions, it would be unconstitutional for any amended 
statute to apply retroactively to Thornton‟s conduct. 
Federal courts have had similar difficulties in attempting to 
apply ambiguous statutory language to Internet impersonation 
cases.52  In one of the most tragic online impersonation cases in the 
last decade, a Missouri woman, Lori Drew, was prosecuted under 
federal law when her atrocious actions led to the suicide of Megan 
Meier, a thirteen-year-old classmate of Drew‟s daughter.53  Drew and 
other co-conspirators registered a fictitious profile on the website 
MySpace.com (“MySpace”), impersonating a boy named Josh 
Evans.54  “The conspirators contacted Megan through the MySpace 
network . . . using the Josh Evans pseudonym and began to flirt with 
her over a number of days.”55  In one of the last communications with 
Megan, “the conspirators had „Josh‟ tell Megan that he no longer 
liked her and that „the world would be a better place without her in 
 
                                                                                                                                       
49 See Edward A. Zunz, Jr. & Edwin F. Chociey, Jr., Review of Statutes And Other 
Legislation, 40 N.J. PRAC., APPELLATE PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 4.26 (2d ed. 2011) 
(“Courts can apply statutes retroactively under appropriate circumstances, but courts 
generally favor prospective application of statutes.  Courts will use a two-part test to 
determine whether a statute should apply retroactively; the first inquiry is whether the 
legislature intended to give the statute retroactive application, and the second question is 
whether the statute‟s retroactive application will result in either an unconstitutional 
interference with vested rights or a manifest injustice.”). 
50
U.S. CONST. art. 1 § 10, cl. 1; N.J. CONST., art. IV, § VII. par. 3 (amended 1947).  
51
State v. T.P.M., 460 A.2d 167, 170 (N.J.  Super. Ct. App. Div. 1983).  
52 See, e.g., United States v. Drew, 259 F.R.D. 449, 458 (C.D. Cal. 2009) (stating that the 
meaning of the elements in the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (“CFAA”) is controversial, 
yet the court decided to apply it to Drew‟s case anyway). 
53 Id. at 452. 
54 Id. 
55 Id. 
8
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it.‟ ”56  Shortly thereafter, Megan committed suicide. 57 
State and federal officials in Missouri decided not to 
prosecute Drew due to the lack of applicable criminal charges that 
corresponded with Drew‟s actions.58  The Missouri officials‟ 
acquiescence led to an array of public outrage and scrutiny.59  In 
response, the Los Angeles United States Attorney‟s Office elected to 
prosecute Drew under the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act 
(“CFAA”).60  The CFAA makes it a misdemeanor offense when a 
defendant “intentionally accesses a computer without authorization or 
exceeds authorized access, and thereby obtains . . . information from 
any protected computer.”61  The court in Drew emphasized that the 
central issue in the CFAA analysis was whether Drew‟s conscious 
violations of MySpace‟s terms of service satisfied the statutory 
language of the CFAA.62  The court held that Drew‟s breach of the 
MySpace terms of services satisfied the intentional access or 
exceeding authorized access element of the CFAA.63 
The court then analyzed “whether basing a CFAA 
misdemeanor violation . . . upon the conscious violation of a 
website‟s terms of service runs afoul of the void-for-vagueness 
doctrine.”64  “The void-for-vagueness doctrine has two prongs:  a . . . 
notice sufficiency requirement, and . . . a guideline setting element to 
 
                                                                                                                                       
56 Id.  
57 Drew, 259 F.R.D. at 452. 
58 Amanda Harmon Cooley, Guarding Against a Radical Redefinition of Liability for 
Internet Misrepresentation: The United States v. Drew Prosecution And the Computer Fraud 
And Abuse Act, 14 J. INTERNET L. 1, 14 (2011) (citing David Hunn & Tim Bryant, 
Newspaper Is Denied Access to FBI Records in Suicide Investigation, ST. LOUIS POST-
DISPATCH, Dec. 21, 2007, at C3, available at 2007 WLNR 25214100). 
59 Id. 
60 Id.; 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (Supp. II 2008); see also Jennifer Steinhauer, Woman Found 
Guilty in Web Fraud Tied to Suicide, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 27, 2008, at A25, available at 2008 
WLNR 22673768.  “Thomas P. O‟Brien, the United States attorney in Los Angeles, 
prosecuted the case himself with two subordinates after law enforcement officials in 
Missouri determined Ms. Drew had broken no local laws.”  Id.  The attorneys successfully 
asserted jurisdiction on the ground that MySpace is based in Los Angeles, California.  Id. 
61 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(2)(C). 
62 Drew, 259 F.R.D. at 458 (“[T]he primary question here is whether any conscious 
violation of an Internet website‟s terms of service will cause an individual‟s contact with the 
website via computer to become „intentionally access[ing] . . . without authorization‟ or 
„exceeding authorization.‟ ” (second and third alternations in original) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 
1030(a)(2) (Supp. II 2008))). 
63 Id. at 461. 
64 Id. at 464. 
9
Reznik: Identity Theft on Social Networking
Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2013
464 TOURO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 29 
 
govern law enforcement.”65  As for the notice prong, the court 
articulated that the relevant question was “whether individuals of 
„common intelligence‟ are on notice that a breach of a terms of 
service contract can become a crime under the CFAA.”66  The court 
held that these individuals would not be on notice, and therefore 
concluded that the first prong of the doctrine was satisfied.67  With 
respect to the second prong, the court held that “[t]reating a violation 
of a website‟s terms of service . . . to be sufficient to constitute [the 
CFAA‟s intentional unauthorized access element] would result in 
transforming section 1030(a)(2)(C) into an overwhelmingly 
overbroad enactment that would convert a multitude of otherwise 
innocent Internet users into misdemeanant criminals.”68  The court 
mentioned that the victim in the case, Megan, was also in clear 
violation of one of the MySpace terms of service provisions, which 
required MySpace users to be at least fourteen years old.69  The court 
held that the second prong for the void-for-vagueness doctrine was 
satisfied and concluded: 
[I]f any conscious breach of a website‟s terms of 
service is held to be sufficient by itself to constitute 
intentionally accessing a computer without 
authorization or in excess of authorization, the result 
will be that section 1030(a)(2)(C) becomes a law “that 
affords too much discretion to the police and too little 
notice to citizens who wish to use the [Internet].”70 
Many experts in the field of cyberlaw believe that the 
government‟s argument in Drew was an unwarranted expansion of 
what Congress intended the CFAA to include.71  It is likely that the 
 
                                                                                                                                       
65 Id. at 463. 
66 Id. at 464. 
67 Drew, 259 F.R.D. at 464. 
68 Id. at 466. 
69 Id. 
70 Id. at 467 (second alteration in original) (quoting City of Chi. v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 
64 (1999)). 
71 See Steinhauer, supra note 60 (quoting a former federal prosecutor who said, “As a 
result of the prosecutor‟s highly aggressive, if not unlawful, legal theory . . . it is now a 
crime to „obtain information‟ from a [w]eb site in violation of its terms and service.  This 
cannot be what Congress meant when it enacted the law, but now you have it”). 
10
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Missouri officials were correct in not prosecuting Drew,72 and some 
believe that the United States Attorney in Los Angeles had ulterior 
motives in prosecuting Drew due to the increasing media coverage of 
the case.73  Unquestionably, the egregious facts in Drew‟s case led to 
her prosecution, but regardless of the motivations that gave rise to 
Drew, Drew‟s counsel successfully convinced the court that the 
CFAA does not apply to online impersonation.74  The decision in 
Drew exemplifies the unexplainable absence of any applicable 
federal statute explicitly dealing with the issue of Internet 
impersonation. 
Although Congress has not enacted a statute dealing with the 
issue of impersonation on the Internet, New Jersey and other states 
are following the lead of California and New York in criminalizing 
the creation of fake social networking profiles to injure innocent 
victims.75  The urgency for Congress to enact an Internet 
impersonation statute is exemplified by the number of recent civil 
cases which have been filed in different states against perpetrators 
and social networking sites for damages resulting from creating a 
fake social networking profile.76  It is fascinating to speculate what 
the results of some of these civil cases would be if the perpetrators 
were prosecuted under the applicable identity theft statute of that 
state. 
In Texas, two high-school students created a MySpace profile 
impersonating their vice-principal, Anna Draker.77  The profile, 
which appeared to be created by Draker, “contained her name, photo, 
and place of employment, [and included] explicit and graphic sexual 
references.”78  Draker claimed that the students created a website 
containing “lewd, false, and obscene comments, pictures, and 
 
                                                                                                                                       
72 Cooley, supra note 58. 
73 See Steinhauer, supra note 60 (referring to Drew‟s attorney, who believed that “the trial 
was grandstanding by Mr. Obrien [the United States Attorney on the case] in an effort to 
keep his job”). 
74 See Drew, 259 F.R.D. at 464 (concluding that MySpace‟s “terms of service runs afoul 
of the void-for-vagueness doctrine”). 
75 Internet Imposters, STATE LEGISLATURES, May 1, 2010, at 8, available at 2010 WLNR 
10273597 (stating that Internet impersonation bills were introduced in Pennsylvania and 
West Virginia). 
76 Kay, supra note 11, at 3. 
77 Draker v. Schreiber, 271 S.W.3d 318, 320-21 (Tex. App. 2008). 
78 Id. at 320. 
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graphics that implied she was a lesbian.”79  Draker originally sued the 
students for “defamation and libel per se, as well as [the students‟] 
parents for negligence and gross negligence relating to the parents‟ 
supervision of the students‟ use of the [I]nternet.”80  Draker amended 
her complaint multiple times and ultimately only a claim for 
intentional infliction of emotional distress reached the Texas Court of 
Appeals.81  The court denied Draker any relief for her claim of 
intentional infliction of emotional distress and her claim was 
dismissed.82 
In 2008, when Draker was decided, Texas had not yet passed 
its “online impersonation” statute.83  At that time, the only option 
available for prosecutors in such a case was to use the outdated Texas 
identity theft statute, which stated that a person is guilty of identity 
theft if he or she “with intent to harm or defraud another, obtains, 
possesses, transfers, or uses an item of . . . [personal] identifying 
information of another person without the other person‟s consent.”84  
The old Texas statute was similar to the federal identity theft statute, 
which was mainly concerned with protecting consumers from 
financial injury.85  Under current Texas law, however, a person is 
guilty of online impersonation, a third degree felony, when he or she 
“create[s] a web page on a commercial social networking site” to 
harm or defraud the victim.86  It is quite possible that the high-school 
students in the Draker case would have been aggressively prosecuted 
and likely held guilty under the current online impersonation 
statute.87 
B. Stealing the Password of the Victim 
The second way that an issue of identity theft on the Internet 
 
                                                                                                                                       
79 Id. at 324. 
80 Id. at 321. 
81 Id. 
82 Draker, 271 S.W.3d at 325. 
83 See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 33.07 (West 2011). 
84 TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 32.51 (West 2011). 
85 18 U.S.C. § 1028(a)(7) (2006). 
86 TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 33.07. 
87 See id. (holding a person liable if he or she “create[s] a web page on a commercial 
social networking site” without consent); Draker, 271 S.W.3d at 320-21 (showing that the 
students had created a fake profile without the consent of their principal). 
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can potentially arise is when the perpetrator steals or somehow gains 
access to the victim‟s social media account, and subsequently 
impersonates that victim.88  Though the methodology of 
impersonating the victim is different in such a case, courts and 
legislatures have successfully applied identity theft statutes or state 
and federal cyberstalking statutes.89  However, when the perpetrator 
impersonates a victim by stealing his or her password, more 
complications can arise: potential hackers may have the ability to 
steal valuable financial information or inflict fatal viruses on the 
victim‟s computer.90 
Hacking into social media accounts has been linked to all 
types of relationships, with dating relationships being the most 
prominent.91  Close friends or couples usually do not think twice 
about disclosing their passwords for Facebook or Twitter to each 
other, but recent stories around the country emphasize the necessary 
caution that must be exercised before disclosing such personal 
information.92  One such case involves a twenty-five-year-old woman 
from Minnesota who was recently charged with “taking over [her 
former friend‟s] Facebook account to send messages such as „fat 
lard,‟ „you are so gross,‟ and „the game‟s only begun.‟ ”93  The 
 
                                                                                                                                       
88 See, e.g., In re Rolando S., 129 Cal. Rptr. at 52. 
89 See, e.g., Tom Zeller Jr., Despite Laws, Stalkers Roam on the Internet, N.Y. TIMES, 
Apr. 17, 2006, at A1, available at 2006 WLNR 6394945 (applying cyberstalking statutes to 
cases where the perpetrator gains access to the victim‟s profile). 
90 See Facebook Fraud: Identity Theft Through  Social Networking,  
PROTECTMYID, http://www.protectmyid.com/images/education_center/pdf/050Typesof 
Fraud/7_types%20of%20fraud_social%20networking.pdf (last visited Nov. 27, 2012) 
(“Variations on many well-known email scams have quickly made their way onto 
networking sites.  The sites work hard to identify and prevent misuse of their systems, but 
phishing scams, malware, and cons for cash have all occurred.”). 
91 See Joy Powell, Stalkers and Harassers Plunge into Social Media Beware Who Your 
Friends Really Are: More People Are Taking Over Accounts, Creating Fake Profiles in “A 
New Kind of Crime,” STAR TRIBUNE, Jan. 15, 2011, at 01A, available at 2011 WLNR 
1017657.  The author quotes Jill Oliveira, spokeswoman at the Minnesota Bureau of 
Criminal Apprehension, stating: “We have had a few cases with people initiating false 
Facebook accounts and MySpace accounts . . . .  Usually the person who starts the account is 
an ex-boyfriend or ex-girlfriend.  They tend to have a vendetta against the individual and 
have access to pictures to upload to the false accounts.”  Id. (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
92 See id. (discussing multiple cases of former friends or exes who steal passwords, 
including a woman from Minnesota who faces felony charges for stealing “others‟ Facebook 
and email accounts to send hateful messages”). 
93 Id. 
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Minnesota woman now has a “restraining order barring her from 
impersonating her former friend and [her former friend‟s] husband on 
Facebook.”94  In another case, a twenty-six-year-old man from 
Minnesota was “recently convicted of hijacking a neighbor‟s e-mail 
to send pornographic photos to the neighbor‟s co-workers.”95 
Other times, victims may have no idea who hacked into their 
account, making it very difficult for officials to find the perpetrator 
and making it harder for the victim to escape this nightmare.96  Claire 
E. Miller, a publishing executive in Manhattan, was one of the many 
victims of what has been defined as cyberstalking.97  Cyberstalking 
appears in various different forms: “Installing spyware on a target‟s 
computer[;] . . . GPS (global positioning system) surveillance of 
the . . . victim[]; posting personal or false and humiliating 
information about the victim on the Internet; sending harassing 
emails and text message[s;] and using social media such as Facebook 
or Twitter to post false and humiliating information.”98  Miller had 
been victimized by constant and disturbing “phone calls, e-mail 
messages[,] and even late-night visits from strange men” who were 
seeking delivery on provocative promises made to them by an online 
impersonator.99 
Unfortunately, Miller is not alone in this battle.  Recent 
studies show that “[forty percent] of women have experienced dating 
violence via social media [sites] . . . [twenty percent] of online 
stalkers use social networking to stalk their victims[,] [and] [thirty-
four percent] of female college students [along with fourteen percent] 
of male students have broken into a romantic partner‟s email.”100  A 
psychologist in private practice in Long Island, New York, Elizabeth 
Carll, explained that victims of cyberstalking experience many 
negative emotional reactions.101  Carll stated : “ „If you‟re harassed in 
 
                                                                                                                                       
94 Id. 
95 Powell, supra note 91. 
96 Zeller, supra note 89 (demonstrating that in half the cases, the victim and perpetrator 
are complete strangers). 
97 Id. 
98 Charlene Laino, „Cyberstalking‟: Worse Than In-Person Harassment?, WEBMD (Aug. 
8, 2011), http://www.webmd.com/balance/news/20110808/cyberstalking-worse-than-in-
person-harassment.html. 
99 Zeller, supra note 89. 
100 Laino, supra note 98. 
101 Id. (“[V]ictims of cyberstalking have a wide range of emotional reactions, including 
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school or work, you can come home to a safe environment[,] . . . 
[but] [i]f you‟re cyberstalked, it can be all the time, no matter where 
you are.‟ ”102  Carll stressed that people must protect themselves from 
impersonation and cyberstalking by creating secure passwords and 
not giving their passwords to anyone.103 
While some perpetrators hack into a victim‟s social media 
account for the purpose of stalking or tormenting the victim, other 
perpetrators steal the passwords of innocent users for the purpose of 
obtaining valuable financial information.104  Many well-known email 
scams that have existed for years are migrating their way into social 
networking sites.105  One example is a scam on Twitter in which 
messages are sent to Twitter members impersonating one of the 
members‟ friends.106  These messages are actually sent by trained 
hackers and carry links “designed to steal passwords and recruit 
people for work-at-home schemes to [labor] as money mules,” so that 
the hackers can set up “bank accounts to help thieves extract 
[finances] from hijacked financial accounts.”107  In early 2012, 
Facebook had trouble with a developing scam in which hackers 
hijacked accounts and then impersonated Facebook security.108  The 
impersonated security team sent a personal message to friends, 
reading: “Last Warning: Your Facebook account will be turned off 
because someone has reported you.  Please do re-confirm your 
account security by: (link).”109  The link in the message then sent the 
potential victim to a fake page that looked like Facebook, but was 
actually an external domain; once there, users were told to enter their 
personal information and credit card information.110 
Another similar scam arises when a thief steals a person‟s 
                                                                                                                                       
high levels of stress, anxiety, fear, and helplessness as well as nightmares, hypervigilance, 
undereating or overeating, and sleeping difficulties.”). 
102 Id. 
103 Id. 
104 Facebook Fraud, supra note 90, at 1. 
105 Id. 
106 Byron Acohido, Scammers Hit Twitter with Tainted Tweet Storm Cybervillains 
Repurpose E-mail Spam Techniques, USA TODAY, Sept. 29, 2009, at 7A, available at 2009 
WLNR 19162424. 
107 Id. 
108 Hackers Impersonate Security Team on Facebook, FACECROOKS (Jan. 17, 2012), 
http://facecrooks.com/Scam-Watch/hackers-impersonate-security-team-on-facebook.html. 
109 Id. 
110 Id. 
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online identity and subsequently sends a desperate plea, in a message 
format, for cash to the member‟s online friends.111  A typical message 
may state, “I‟m traveling abroad and all of my money and documents 
have been lost.  Please wire me $500 so I can get home.”112  Naïve, 
but concerned, family members and friends may be tricked by the 
hacker and send the money.113  Hackers can obtain passwords 
through phishing scams or malware, and by simply downloading an 
application or taking an online quiz; thus, innocent victims can be 
providing hackers with the ability to track future activities for the 
purpose of accessing the victims‟ identification names and passwords 
for financial accounts.114 
Appropriate officials may have trouble ascertaining the 
identities of hackers who steal passwords through social networking 
sites; however, if the identities are discovered, federal and state 
cyberlaws exist to deal with these issues.115  In the federal context, as 
long as there is an economic detriment to the victim, the CFAA can 
be utilized to prosecute impersonating hackers.116  On the state level, 
most states have identity theft statutes explicitly prohibiting online 
impersonation to obtain financial records.117 
Unlike the difficulties of prosecuting impersonators who 
create completely fake profiles, there is substantially less difficulty in 
prosecuting online imposters for the act of stealing passwords or 
personal information, which is interpreted as a medium to “cyber-
stalk” victims.118  California and forty-five other states have enacted 
anti-cyberstalking laws within the last decade; on the federal level, 
women can also seek protection under the “Violence Against Women 
and Department of Justice Reauthorization Act of 2005,”119 which 
 
                                                                                                                                       
111 Facebook Fraud, supra note 90, at 1. 
112 Id. 
113 Id. 
114 Id. at 1-2. 
115 Zeller, supra note 89. 
116 18 U.S.C. § 1030(g) (2006). 
117 See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-2008(A) (2004) (West); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 
190.25(1) (McKinney 2008); CAL. PENAL CODE § 530.5(a) (West 2011). 
118 See Zeller, supra note 89 (demonstrating how a former security guard was sentenced to 
six years in prison under the California cyberstalking law for using his ex-girlfriend‟s 
personal information to impersonate her in chat rooms and personals sites.  While 
impersonating his girlfriend, “[h]e posted rape fantasies . . . [and] begged strangers to deliver 
on them” after giving strangers his ex-girlfriend‟s home address). 
119 Violence Against Women and Department of Justice Reauthorization Act of 2005, 
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“updated telephone harassment law to include computer 
communications.”120 
An issue that now presents itself is, what type of Internet 
impersonation would not be considered cyberstalking and therefore 
not be prosecutable under the cyberstalking statutes.121  The 
determinative factor on whether a perpetrator will be prosecuted 
under an identity theft statute or a cyberstalking statute seems to be 
the foreseeable harm from the perpetrator‟s impersonation.122  In In 
re Rolando S., a teenager was prosecuted under the California 
identity theft statute, not the cyberstalking statute, when he gained 
access to a classmate‟s Facebook page and posted explicit sexual 
material on it.123  On the other hand, a California man, Gary S. 
Dellapenta, who impersonated his ex-girlfriend by stealing her 
personal information to access a dating website, causing multiple 
men to arrive at her house, was prosecuted under the California 
cyberstalking statute.124  The foreseeable harm for the victim in In re 
Rolando S. was sufficiently less than the foreseeable harm to 
Dellapenta‟s ex-girlfriend because the latter was subjected to the 
arrival of strange men at her doorstep. 
Thus, it seems that cyberstalking statutes are often triggered 
when the victim is more likely to be placed in reasonable fear of his 
                                                                                                                                       
Pub. L. No. 109-162, 119 Stat. 2960 (2006). 
120 Zeller, supra note 89. 
121 See CAL. PENAL CODE § 653.2(a) (West 2010).  Section 653.2(a) states: 
Every person who, with intent to place another person in reasonable fear 
for his or her safety, or the safety of the other person‟s immediate 
family, by means of an electronic communication device, and without 
consent of the other person, and for the purpose of imminently causing 
that other person unwanted physical contact, injury, or harassment, by a 
third party, electronically distributes, publishes, e-mails, hyperlinks, or 
makes available for downloading, personal identifying information, 
including, but not limited to, a digital image of another person, or an 
electronic message of a harassing nature about another person, which 
would be likely to incite or produce that unlawful action, is guilty of a 
misdemeanor punishable by up to one year in a county jail, by a fine of 
not more than one thousand dollars ($1,000), or by both that fine and 
imprisonment.  Id. 
122 Compare In re Rolando S., 129 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 51-52 (electing to prosecute defendant 
under an identity theft statute because the posting of embarrassing comments was not very 
dangerous), with Zeller, supra note 89 (sentencing ex-boyfriend who posted rape fantasies 
under his ex-girlfriend‟s name under the cyberstalking statute). 
123 In re Rolando S., 129 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 51-52. 
124 Zeller, supra note 89; see CAL. PENAL CODE § 653.2. 
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or her safety.125  However, prosecutors are more likely to utilize 
identity theft statutes when the online impersonation caused some 
sort of harm to the victim, but the victim was not placed in reasonable 
fear of his or her safety.126  Thus, the controlling factor to determine 
what statutory scheme should be used is the degree of harm the 
victim confronts.127 
III. APPLICABLE STATUTES CONCERNING IDENTITY THEFT ON 
THE INTERNET 
A. Original Identity Theft Statutes 
The earliest identity theft statute in the United States was 
enacted in 1996 in Arizona.128  The Arizona statute renders a 
perpetrator guilty of identity theft when he or she: 
[K]nowingly takes . . . or uses any personal identifying 
information . . . of another person[,] . . . including a 
real or fictitious person or entity, without the consent 
of that other person or entity, with the intent to obtain 
or use the other person‟s or entity‟s identity for any 
unlawful purpose or to cause loss to a person or entity 
whether or not the person or entity actually suffers any 
economic loss as a result of the offense . . . .129 
The Arizona legislature sought to deter potential perpetrators by 
stressing the severity of the offense and labeling the crime of identity 
theft as a class 4 felony.130  In Arizona, a class 4 felony “translates 
into a sentence of between one-and-one-half and three years in prison 
 
                                                                                                                                       
125 See In re Rolando S., 129 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 51-52 (prosecuting defendant under the 
California identity theft statute and not the cyberstalking statute). 
126 See, e.g., Zeller, supra note 89 (sentencing ex-boyfriend who posted rape fantasies 
under his ex-girlfriend‟s name under the cyberstalking statute). 
127 Compare Zeller, supra note 89 (prosecuting under cyber stalking statute because 
conduct created a risk of reasonable harm), with In re Rolando S., 129 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 51-52 
(applying identity theft statute when victim‟s Facebook page was used by defendant to post 
obscene material because no great risk of harm was generated). 
128 Catherine Pastrikos, Comment, Identity Theft Statutes:  Which Will Protect Americans 
the Most, 67 ALB. L. REV. 1137, 1138 (2004); see also ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-2008 
(2004) (West). 
129 ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-2008. 
130 Id. at § 13-2008(F); see also Pastrikos, supra note 128. 
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for first time offenders.”131  Even today, Arizona‟s statute is silent on 
the issue of identity theft on the Internet.132  However, as with laws in 
other jurisdictions, the excessively broad language in the Arizona 
statute would probably force many Arizona judges to determine that 
knowingly taking or using another person‟s social media account 
“without the consent of that other person” and “with the intent to 
obtain or use the other person‟s” social media account to “cause loss” 
to the other person133 would satisfy the identity theft statute.134 
In 1998, two years after Arizona‟s state statute was 
implemented, Congress enacted the Federal Identity Theft and 
Assumption Deterrence Act.135  The Act made it a federal crime to 
knowingly possess or use, “without lawful authority, a means of 
identification of another person with the intent to commit . . . any 
unlawful activity that constitutes a violation of Federal law, or . . . any 
applicable State or local law . . . .”136  The Act addressed identity 
theft on the federal level in two ways:  it “strengthen[ed] the criminal 
laws governing identity theft,” and it focused on the consumers as the 
victims.137  The federal law on identity theft is specifically directed at 
economic losses suffered by consumers.138  This is in direct contrast 
to the Arizona statute, which explicitly states that economic loss to 
the victim is not required.139  Thus, under the federal statute, or any 
statute similar, the prosecution of a perpetrator of identity theft on a 
social media site for non-economic purposes would likely be 
dismissed.140 
 
                                                                                                                                       
131 Pastrikos, supra note 128; see also ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-702(D) (2004) (West). 
132 See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-2008. 
133 Id.  
134 See Hansen, supra note 1 (paraphrasing a judge who held that the prosecution of a 
woman for impersonating her ex-boyfriend by creating a fake Facebook account would 
proceed, even though the New Jersey statute was silent concerning electronic 
communications, specifically Internet communications). 
135 18 U.S.C. § 1028(a)(7) (2006); Pastrikos, supra note 128, at 139-40; see also Charles 
Harwood, Dir., Identity Theft (Jan. 29, 2001), available at 2001 WL 85693, at *1. 
136 18 U.S.C. § 1028(a)(7). 
137 Harwood, supra note 135. 
138 See S. REP. NO. 105-274, at 4 (1998) (listing that the second purpose of the bill is “to 
recognize the individual victims of identity theft crimes, and establish their right to 
restitution to include all costs related to regaining good credit or reputation.”). 
139 ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-2008(A) (2004) (West). 
140 Compare 18 U.S.C. § 1028(a)(7) (requiring a financial detriment as a key element to 
the statute), with N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 14-113.20(a) (West 2005) (requiring a financial 
detriment as a key element to the statutory provision). 
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B. New York Identity Theft Statute 
Under New York law, “A person is guilty of criminal 
impersonation in the second degree when he . . . [i]mpersonates 
another by communication by [I]nternet website . . . with intent to 
obtain a benefit or injure or defraud another . . . .”141  New York was 
the first state to implement such explicit language concerning identity 
theft on the Internet into a separate subdivision of its identity theft 
statute.142  On March 23, 2007, the New York Senate and Assembly 
unanimously approved the memorandum in support of the legislative 
bill, which amended the identity theft statute to incorporate Internet 
impersonation.143  The memorandum stressed that Internet 
“impersonation has become an increasingly large problem in the 
United States” because of the ease of impersonating another via 
Internet communications.144  It further directed that “misrepresenting 
oneself through the use of the Internet become a crime in order to 
deter the plethora of cases presently occurring.”145 
The memorandum also mentioned an incident of Internet 
impersonation in Suffolk County that prompted the Senate to take 
action.146  In this incident, Michael Valentine, a Suffolk County 
police officer, “hack[ed] into the Yahoo e-mail account of a woman 
he had briefly dated and posing as her [during] online 
communications.”147  The Suffolk County District Attorney 
discovered that Mr. Valentine “accessed the woman‟s personal 
profile on the dating site Match.com, sending electronic „winks‟ and 
other [electronic] communications to 70 different men on the site.”148  
Two men even showed up to the woman‟s house after 
communicating with Valentine through her Match.com profile.149 
The memorandum emphasized countless numbers of 
documented cases like Valentine‟s, “where perpetrators gain access 
into another person[‟s] account and pose as them through the use of 
 
                                                                                                                                       
141 N.Y. PENAL LAW § 190.25(4) (McKinney 2008). 
142 See id. 
143 S. 4053, 2007-2008 Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2008). 
144 Id. 
145 Id. 
146 Id. 
147 Zeller, supra note 89. 
148 Id. 
149 Id. 
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online communications.”150  The New York legislature‟s findings 
were indeed accurate, with similar Internet impersonation horror 
stories appearing all over the country.151  The New York legislature 
has been a pioneer in the effort to protect victims of Internet identity 
theft, as is evidenced by the new identity theft statute.152  Other 
jurisdictions would be wise to follow the footsteps of the New York 
Senate by creating an explicit subdivision dealing with Internet 
impersonation within their respective identity theft statutes, thus 
eliminating the potential ambiguity an identity theft statute may have 
concerning internet impersonation. 
C. California Identity Theft Statute 
California took an even a bigger step than New York when it 
enacted its Internet identity theft statute in January 2011.153  Rather 
than just adding a separate subdivision on Internet impersonation like 
New York, California created a completely separate statute in order 
to protect its citizens from Internet identity theft.154  The statute states 
that “any person who knowingly and without consent credibly 
impersonates another actual person through or on an Internet Web 
site . . . for purposes of harming, intimidating, threatening, or 
defrauding another person is guilty” of identity theft.155 
Unlike previous statutes, section 528.5 made specific 
purposes such as “harming, intimidating, threatening, or defrauding” 
illegal after the perpetrator has gained access to the victim‟s 
profile.156  The California legislature‟s implementation of these 
specific purposes reached the heart of the most devastating effects of 
Internet impersonation.  Traditionally, “harming, intimidating, 
threatening, or defrauding”157 a person by impersonation on the 
 
                                                                                                                                       
150 N.Y. S. 4053. 
151 See, e.g., Hansen, supra note 1 (“Bradley Shear, a Bethesda, Md., lawyer who 
specializes in online issues, said he expects to see more cases like this one in the near 
future.”); Drew, 259 F.R.D. 449. 
152 Hansen, supra note 1. 
153 See CAL. PENAL CODE § 528.5 (West 2011). 
154 Id. 
155 Id. 
156 Id. 
157 Id. 
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Internet has only given rise to civil, but not criminal, liability.158  
However, California retreated from this traditional notion by 
criminalizing Internet impersonation.159 
In response to the vague reasoning the California Court of 
Appeals provided in In re Rolando S., the California legislature 
enacted section 528.5.160  The lengthy and ambiguous analysis 
concerning the legislature‟s intent on what qualifies as an unlawful 
purpose in In re Rolando S.  was clarified by the enactment of section 
528.5; California‟s current Internet impersonation statute is one of the 
most sophisticated statutes concerning Internet identity theft.161  In a 
world where young people naively divulge too much information on 
social networking sites, sophisticated and explicit statutes dealing 
with Internet impersonation are absolutely necessary.  Experts 
believe that Internet impersonation cases are on the rise,162 but it 
seems that only a few states are taking the appropriate legislative 
steps to deter potential perpetrators.163 
 
D. Other States’ Statutory Schemes Corresponding 
with Online Impersonation 
In late 2011, Texas enacted an “online impersonation” statute, 
which makes it a third degree felony when a perpetrator “without 
obtaining the other person‟s consent and with the intent to harm, 
defraud, intimidate, or threaten any person, uses the name or persona 
of another person to . . . create a web page on a commercial social 
networking site or other Internet website; or . . . post . . . messages on 
or through a commercial social networking site.”164  The Texas 
 
                                                                                                                                       
158 Kay, supra note 11, at 17. 
159 See In re Rolando S., 129 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 58 (finding appellant‟s conduct to be a 
criminal offense). 
160 See id. at 55-56 (“[T]he Senate Committee report for the bill introducing the 
amendment makes clear that the purpose of the „any unlawful purpose‟ language was to 
broaden the scope of punishable conduct.”); CAL. PENAL. CODE § 528.5. 
161 See CAL. PENAL. CODE § 528.5. 
162 Hansen, supra note 1. 
163 See Internet Imposters, supra note 75 (showing that California, New York, 
Pennsylvania, and West Virginia were the few states to introduce Internet impersonation 
bills). 
164 TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 33.07 (a)(1)(2) (West 2011). 
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statute contains effective statutory language to criminalize both 
methods of online impersonation.165  Provision (a)(1) explicitly 
prohibits a person from “creat[ing] a web page on a commercial 
social networking site,” and unambiguously criminalizes any person 
who creates a fake profile impersonating another person with the 
purpose to “harm, defraud, intimidate, or threaten” that person.166  
Under (a)(2) of the statute, a person is guilty if he or she “post[s] . . . 
one or more messages . . . through a commercial social networking 
site” while using the name of another person.167  This subdivision 
implicitly applies to the stealing method of Internet impersonation 
and a Texas perpetrator will undoubtedly be found guilty under the 
statute if he or she gains access to a victim‟s account by stealing 
personal information and subsequently purports to be that person by 
sending lewd messages within the victim‟s social network.168 
Unlike Texas, some states would have an immense amount of 
difficulty in attempting to prosecute a perpetrator for either of the two 
methods of online impersonation.  For example, North Carolina has 
an identity theft statute that makes it illegal for a person to use 
another‟s identifying information “for the purposes of making 
financial or credit transactions.”169  North Carolina also has a cyber-
bullying statute that makes it illegal to “[b]uild a fake profile or [w]eb 
site” if “the intent [was] to intimidate or torment a minor.”170  Thus, 
the North Carolina legislature is only concerned with Internet identity 
theft in the financial context and in protecting minors.171  As many 
cases around the nation point out, however, online impersonation on 
social media sites can cause serious issues outside the financial realm 
and affect victims of all ages.172 
 
 
                                                                                                                                       
165 See id. (covering cases where an impersonator either creates the web page, or posts 
messages on the victim‟s already existing web page, without the victim‟s consent). 
166 Id. 
167 Id. at § 33.07 (a)(2).  
168 See id. (criminalizing Internet impersonation). 
169 N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 14-113.20(a) (West 2005). 
170 N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 14-458.1(a)(1)(a) (West 2009). 
171 See id.; N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 14-113.20. 
172 Zeller, supra note 89 (discussing multiple cases of women over the age of eighteen 
who suffered serious consequences from a perpetrator who impersonated their identities 
online). 
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IV. IDEAL STATUTE AND OTHER SOLUTIONS TO PREVENT THE 
HARMS OF IDENTITY THEFT ON THE  INTERNET 
A. Ideal Statute 
As this Comment has explained, identity theft on the Internet 
is a real and serious issue in our society.173  States that do not 
implement sophisticated statutes which explicitly incorporate 
different methods of online impersonation are subjecting their 
citizens to potentially disastrous consequences.174  Outdated identity 
theft statutes that are mainly concerned with financial detriments are 
not sufficient to encompass online impersonation within their 
statutory framework.175  On the other hand, states that enacted a 
statute or subdivision to prevent online impersonation are at the 
forefront of protecting the psychological and emotional well being of 
potential victims.176 
Unfortunately, “[t]he Internet knows no jurisdictional 
boundaries,” and states such as California and New York may have 
trouble in enforcing online impersonation statutes if the perpetrator 
lives outside of the state.177  There is no question that every state 
should make an effort to produce some type of legislation dealing 
with online impersonation; however, the only way to successfully 
punish and deter online impersonation is for Congress to enact a 
federal statute that explicitly recognizes and prohibits online 
impersonation through social networking media sites.178  An ideal 
federal statute should be based on the current New York and 
California statutes, which acknowledge the two different methods for 
online impersonation within the statutory language and recognize 
specific types of websites that are susceptible to online 
 
                                                                                                                                       
173 See supra Part II. A-B. 
174 See Drew, 259 F.R.D. at 452 (showing that a thirteen-year-old-girl committed suicide 
after her classmate‟s mother impersonated a young boy to ridicule her). 
175 See id. at 464 (holding that the CFAA did not encompass online impersonation); see 
also 18 U.S.C. § 1028(a)(7) (2006); Draker, 271 S.W.3d at 325 (holding that two teens 
impersonating their principal were not even subject to civil liability). 
176 See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 190.25(4) (McKinney 2008); see also CAL. PENAL CODE § 
528.5 (West 2011). 
177 Hansen, supra note 1 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Bradley Shear, Esq.). 
178 See 18 U.S.C. § 1028(a)(7) (indicating that the current federal identity theft statute 
does not adequately recognize online impersonation); 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2006) (showing 
how the CFAA similarly does not adequately recognize online impersonation). 
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impersonation.179 
The New York and the California statutes use similar 
statutory language to identify the potential actions that give rise to 
online impersonation.180  The New York statute holds a perpetrator 
guilty of criminal impersonation if he or she “[i]mpersonates another 
by communication by [I]nternet website or electronic means.”181  
Similarly, the California statute holds a person guilty of 
impersonation when he or she “credibly impersonates another actual 
person through or on an Internet [w]eb site or by other electronic 
means.”182  These statutes are unnecessarily broad because online 
impersonation, with respect to social media sites, can occur in only 
two ways: either by stealing personal information to gain access or by 
creating a fake profile.183  Thus, an ideal statute should explicitly 
state that a person would be guilty of criminal impersonation if he or 
she impersonates another person by creating a fake profile of another 
person or by wrongfully gaining access to the victim‟s account.  In 
order to stay on the safe side a term such as “or [by other] electronic 
means,” which is evident in the New York and California statutes, 
should follow the two methods.184 
The next phrase that is required within the statutory 
framework is to identify what type of conduct and injury will be 
punishable when an impersonation occurs.185  The New York online 
impersonation statute requires the potential perpetrator to act “with 
[the] intent to obtain a benefit or injure or defraud another,”186 while 
the California statute also includes “harming, intimidating, [and] 
threatening” the victim as punishable conduct.187  In many situations, 
it may be difficult to ascertain whether a perpetrator‟s actions 
actually “injure or defraud” the victim, but the victim nevertheless 
experiences severe psychological or emotional harm.188  This is 
 
                                                                                                                                       
179 See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 190.25(4); CAL. PENAL CODE § 528.5. 
180 See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 190.25(4); CAL. PENAL CODE § 528.5. 
181 N.Y. PENAL LAW § 190.25(4). 
182 CAL. PENAL CODE § 528.5. 
183 Facebook Fraud, supra note 90. 
184 N.Y. PENAL LAW § 190.25(4); CAL. PENAL CODE § 528.5. 
185 See Horowitz, supra note 21 (discussing a dispute over whether there was sufficient 
injury under the applicable statute). 
186 N.Y. PENAL LAW § 190.25(4). 
187 CAL. PENAL CODE § 528.5. 
188 See Drew, 259 F.R.D. at 452 (explaining how a thirteen-year-old girl committed 
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precisely why an ideal statute would mimic the types of conduct 
listed in the California statute.189  The four types of conduct listed in 
the California statute protect potential victims from a wide array of 
foreseeable danger, while simultaneously not transforming an 
innocuous act of online impersonation into a crime.190 
Finally, it is imperative for an ideal statute to include 
examples of the types of websites that are susceptible to online 
impersonation; however, this list would not be exclusive or 
exhaustive, and would only provide examples.191  Though social 
media sites are the hotbed for online impersonation, other Internet 
websites such as dating websites, email websites, and other 
interactive sites can all lead to online impersonation and give rise to 
all types of negative consequences for victims.192  In fact, some of the 
most dangerous online impersonation cases arise from dating 
websites when the perpetrator convinces random people to come to 
the victim‟s house.193  Other horror stories include victims who are 
terrorized for months because the perpetrator gained access to the 
victim‟s email account and subsequently stole personal information 
to harm the victim.194  The New York statute does not explicitly 
recognize these types of examples,195 whereas the California statute 
states that “ „electronic means‟ shall include opening an e-mail 
account or an account or profile on a social networking Internet 
[w]eb site.”196  An ideal statute would define Internet websites and 
explicitly state that Internet websites would include, and not be 
limited to, social networking sites, email websites, dating websites, 
and other Internet websites requiring personal information to gain 
access. 
 
                                                                                                                                       
suicide after her classmate‟s mom impersonated a young boy with the purpose to ridicule 
her); Zeller, supra note 89 (giving examples of two men who gave their ex-girlfriends‟ 
personal information to random men through the ex-girlfriends‟ dating profiles). 
189 See generally CAL. PENAL CODE § 528.5. 
190 Id. 
191 See Zeller, supra note 89 (demonstrating that online impersonation can occur on dating 
websites, email websites, and online personals, in addition to social media sites). 
192 Id. 
193 Id. 
194 Id. 
195 See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 190.25(4) (McKinney 2008). 
196 CAL. PENAL CODE § 528.5(c) (West 2011). 
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B. Collective Effort from Society to Prevent Online 
Impersonation 
The trend to outlaw online impersonation is growing quite 
rapidly, yet a substantial majority of states do not have online 
impersonation statutes.197  This means that there are a plethora of 
victims, especially children and teenagers, in the United States who 
are subject to being impersonated with no statutory protection 
available.  This is precisely why people must protect themselves and 
their children through simple, but very effective, proactive steps to 
secure their social media networking accounts.198 
Many sites, such as Facebook and Twitter, have “remember 
password” functions that allow users to enter the websites account 
without manually entering their password.199  Social media site users 
should avoid these types of automatic login features and manually 
login in every time they enter their social media account to protect 
themselves from impersonation.200  Social media site users should 
also be aware of the dangers present when not logging off properly 
from their accounts.201  Because logging out properly after every 
session will protect users from online impersonation, parents or 
caregivers would be wise to relay this message to children who 
frequently are the most likely to avoid these safety precautions.202 
Another simple but very efficient method to protect oneself 
from impersonation is to use strong passwords.203  Experts 
recommend using passwords that contain a combination of upper and 
 
                                                                                                                                       
197 See Hansen, supra note 1. 
198 See Rob Frappier, Protecting Your Teen from Online Impersonation, IKEEPSAFE (July 
25, 2011), http://www.ikeepsafe.org/cyberbullying-2/protecting-your-teen-from-online-
impersonation/ (listing the steps that parents can take in order to protect their children). 
199 Id. 
200 Id. 
201 Linda McCarthy, Keith Watson & Denise Weldon-Siviy, A Guide to Facebook 
Security: For Young Adults, Parents, and Educators, FACEBOOK, available at 
http://www.facebook.com/safety/attachment/Guide%20to%20Facebook%20Security.pdf 
(last visited Jan. 8, 2013). 
202 See id. (“Logging out of Facebook when you‟re not using it is a simple and effective 
way to protect your account.  Many people think that if they close the web page or exit the 
browser that also logs them out of Facebook.  It doesn‟t.”); Frappier, supra note 198 (“In 
addition to telling your kids to skip the remember password function, you should remind 
them to always log off after a social media session.”). 
203 Impersonation and Fraudulent Use, UNIV. OF TORONTO, http://www.enough.utoronto.ca/ 
computeruse/frauduse.htm (last visited Jan. 8, 2013). 
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lower-case letters, numbers, and symbols.204  Strong passwords 
should not consist of “common words in the dictionary, or obvious 
things” such as one‟s birthday.205  Further, users are advised to take 
further precaution and protect these passwords by not writing them 
down and not posting them or storing them on their computers.206 
Recently, Facebook has taken its own measures to prevent 
online impersonation on its website.207  Facebook created the 
“REPORT/BLOCK THIS PERSON” feature, which is available on 
the bottom-left side of every Facebook profile.208  This feature 
enables users to report imposters who are impersonating victims and 
authorizes the Facebook security team to catch the perpetrators.209  
However, some of the reports that the Facebook security team 
receives are fraudulent, and thus another way in which some 
perpetrators harass victims.210  In order to circumvent this problem, 
Facebook security requires that the complainant give a valid phone 
number.211  The security team then sends a verification code to that 
phone number, and once the complainant enters the code into the 
report, the security team begins its investigation.212  Facebook users 
can also use the report/block feature to report “businesses pretending 
to be people, and [even] hate groups masquerading as people.”213  
These types of reports do not require any additional steps beyond 
clicking on the hyperlink on the bottom-left side of the webpage.214 
Twitter, which is best known for the ability to interact with 
celebrities, has created its own method to battle online 
impersonation.215  Twitter uses a “Verified Accounts” function that 
 
                                                                                                                                       
204 Id. 
205 Id. 
206 Id. 
207 See McCarthy et al., supra note 201 (teaching Facebook users how to report 
impersonators). 
208 Id. 
209 Id. 
210 Id. 
211 Id. 
212 McCarthy et al., supra note 201. 
213 Id. 
214 Id. 
215 See Susan M. Brazas, Twitter Verified Accounts and Protecting Identities, 
LAWYERS.COM, http://communications-media.lawyers.com/privacy-law/Twitter-Verified-
Accounts-and-Protecting-Identities.html (last visited Jan. 8, 2013) (“Twitter has announced 
that it is launching „Verified Accounts‟ in an effort to protect the integrity of its account 
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proves the integrity of the profile.216  When a public official, agency, 
or other well-known profile is stamped with the “Verified Account” 
approval, then that profile is indeed what it purports be.217 
Social media sites such as Facebook and Twitter have made 
valiant efforts to protect users from online impersonation.  However, 
the only way individuals can truly protect themselves is to be aware 
of online impersonation and be proactive in limiting their exposure to 
potential risks.  Social media users would be wise to keep personal 
information, such as their passwords, absolutely private and not 
hesitate to report or seek help from an external source when they fear 
their identity may have been impersonated. 
V. CONCLUSION   
Social networking sites are here to stay and it is the 
responsibility of the federal government and every state to protect 
individuals from perpetrators who seek to impersonate potential 
innocent victims through the use of such sites.  Whether the method 
is by creating a fake profile or stealing personal information to access 
the victim‟s profile, Internet impersonation can be severely 
detrimental to potential victims.  The weakest people in our society 
are those who decide to anonymously bash others on the Internet.  
These people deserve to be at least mildly punished and deterred 
from engaging in this conduct in the future.  Unfortunately, only a 
handful of states have implemented statutes or subdivisions that 
explicitly concern identity theft on the Internet, or more specifically, 
online impersonation.218  Some states possess outdated identity theft 
statutes that need to be modified in order to prevent difficulties when 
dealing with online impersonation.219  As our world becomes more 
dependent on the Internet, so must our laws. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                       
holders‟ identities.”). 
216 Id. 
217 Id. 
218 See, e.g., N.Y. PENAL LAW § 190.25(4) (McKinney 2008); CAL. PENAL CODE § 528.5 
(West 2011); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 33.07 (West 2011). 
219 See 18 U.S.C. § 1028(a)(7); see also Drew, 259 F.R.D. at 464 (holding that the CFAA 
did not encompass online impersonation); Draker, 271 S.W.3d at 325 (holding that two teens 
impersonating their principal were not subject to civil liability). 
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